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Agricultural, Resource, and Ecological Economics 
with a 'MultifunctionaIity' Perspective 
Thomas L. Dobbs 
It would seem that agriculture in industrialized countries is experiencing 'the best 
of times' and 'the worst of times'. Productivity per unit of land and, consequently, 
aggregate food and fiber output have climbed dramatically since World War II. Food is 
generally 'cheap' relative to average per capita incomes. However, the costs of this 
abundance are becoming increasingly apparent. Drinking water supplies are becoming 
contaminated, bird and fish populations have declined, plant and animal biodiversity has 
been lost, and soil organic matter has declined. Also, agriculture appears increasingly 
vulnerable to human and animal health scares. Witness the recent outbreaks in Europe of 
'mad cow disease' (bovine spongifonn encephalopathy, or BSE) and 'foot and mouth 
disease'. Moreover, hired farm laborers and animal slaughtering house workers often are 
poorly paid and work in unsafe conditions. In spite of the abundant and cheap food 
supplies, poverty and malnutrition persist among some groups within the larger, affluent 
societies of industrialized countries. Persistently 'low' crop prices have caused 
governments to continue-and even increase-large direct payments to farmers to 
support their incomes. Add to these concerns the increasing economic concentration and 
vertical integration within both the agricultural supply sector and the agricultural 
processing and marketing sector that are causing farmers to feel ever more vulnerable to 
'market forces'. 
This apparent contradiction between agricultural abundance, on the one hand, and 
ecological and social breakdown, on the other, has caused the British government to fold 
its agricultural and food ministry into a new, combined Department of the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs. This was a prelude to proposals for radical reform of agricultural 
in the United Kingdom (UK) that would put much greater emphasis on 
'multifunctionality' . In France, the government has recently launched a program of 
Contrats Territorailes d'Exploitation (land management agreements, or CTEs) as part of 
its expanded emphasis on multifunctionality. Even the US Congress finally began to 
openly discuss a more multifunctional approach to agricultural policy in dialogue leading 
up to passage of a new Federal 'farm bill' earlier this year. Although that new legislation 
retains and reinforces the historically strong emphasis on support for conventional 
agricultural commodities, the newly created Conservation Security Program does contain 
elements ofa more multifunctional perspective. 
Multifunctionality 
A 'multifunctionality' approach to agricultural policy-or, more aptly, agri­
environmental policy-explicitly acknowledges that agriculture has several functions in 
addition to producing food and fiber (Dobbs and Pretty, 200 I b, pp. 2-6). Agriculture also 
can provide goods and services that are 'ecological' and 'social' in nature. Ecological or 
environmental functions include provision of clean water supplies, bird and other wildlife 
habitat, scenic landscapes, carbon sequestration (to reduce greenhouse gases and mitigate 
global warming), and flood protection (by wetlands). Social functions include provision 
of rural employment and, potentially at least, support for democratic institutions based on 
'Jeffersonian' ideals of egalitarian land holding patterns and associated 'structures of 
agriculture' . 
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How these multiple functions are expressed is often related to scale. Food 
production may be primarily for local or regional consumption, or primarily for national 
or international markets, depending on how agricultural economies are organized. Some 
ecological services, such as provision of habitat for particular wildlife species, may be 
primarily local in nature. Clean water supplies may sometimes benefit primarily people 
outside the local area, but elsewhere within the watershed-namely residents of urban 
areas. Carbon sequestration is very much a global function of agriculture. Rural 
employment is primarily local in nature, whereas contributions to 'Jeffersonian 
democracy ideals' have both regional and national implications. 
It is apparent that multifunctional economic analyses must start with particular 
spatial perspectives. For purposes of this paper, I will assume three different 
perspectives: (1) that of the individual farm, where decisions in market economies about 
production practices and systems have traditionally been made; (2) that of the local or 
regional level, ranging from the community surrounding a rural town up to watershed, 
State, and multi-State areas representing particular types of agricultural ecosystems; and 
(3) that of national and international economies, where effects of agricultural systems on 
food prices, human and animal health, and climate change are felt-and where public 
policies are made that powerfully impact the structure and directions of agriculture. 
Economic Treatment of Multifunctionality 
Economists have been using some economic analysis methods for many years that 
directly relate to agriculture's multi functionality. The field of 'natural resource 
economics' (earlier known as 'land economics') has roots in late-18th and early-19th 
Century writings of the British 'Classical' economists Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and 
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Thomas Malthus. 'Land economics' became an important area of inquiry in the U.S. in 
the late-19th and early-20th Centuries, drawing initially on the German historical school of 
economics. The University of Wisconsin was an early and prominent leading institution 
in land economics research and teaching. The economics of conservation took on 
prominence in the 1950s at the University of California, under the leadership of Ciriacy­
Wantrup, and comprehensive work on a broad set of natural resource economics concerns 
began to take place under the leadership and sponsorship of Resources for the Future, 
established in Washington, D.C. in 1952. The body of work known as modern 'welfare 
economics' began to be systematically included in natural resources research and policy 
analysis. This led to many published works about, and a deeper understanding of, 
'externality' and 'public goods' dimensions of agriculture in the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s. (Castle, et aI., 1981) Resource economists devoted substantial attention to the 
valuation of 'non-market' environmental goods during the last three decades of the 20th 
Century. 
While the concepts of 'externalities' and 'public goods' dominated mainstream 
natural resource economics work from the 1960s through the 1990s, a related but more 
radical form of economic thinking about agricultural and other natural resources arose 
during the 1980s-'ecological economics' (Costanza, et al., 1997, p. 49). This emerged 
out of a combination of ecology and economics, much as the discipline of 'agricultural 
economics' had emerged out of a combination of agronomy and economics around the 
beginning of the 20th Century (Dobbs, 1987). The writings of University of Colorado 
economist Kenneth Boulding, starting in the mid-1960s, were instrumental in helping to 
bring together the thinking of ecology and economics, disciplines which had been 
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pursued largely apart from each other during most of the 20th Century (Costanza, et aI., 
1997, p. 51). 'Ecological economics' takes a more holistic perspective than does 'natural 
resource economics', and--drawing on its ecology roots--explicitly considers the 
interconnectedness of the various components of natural resource systems. Ecological 
economics also poses fundamental questions about the ecological sustainability of 
different economic systems, whereas natural resource economics tends to take market­
based economic systems as given and considers how the systems might be fine-tuned to 
produce more socially desirable ecological results. In fairness, ecological economics 
draws heavily on the body of theory that was built up over a century in 'land' and 
'natural resource' economics. However, ecological economics opens the door to a wider 
range of policy considerations than, traditionally applied, does natural resource 
economics. 
In the sections of this paper to follow, I will draw on both 'natural resource 
economics' and 'ecological economics', though I will not stress distinctions between the 
two. First, I will discuss applications of multifunctional economic analysis at the farm 
level. Then, I will discuss applications at the local or regional level, drawing heavily on 
'natural resource economics'. In the last section, dealing with multifunctional economic 
analysis at the national and international level, I draw on both natural resource economics 
and ecological economics. 
Analyses at the Farm Level 
Following Crews, et al. (1991), I usually define ecological sustainability in 
ecological terms. Once ecological sustainability objectives have been specified at the 
farm level, economics enters the picture. Farming systems thought to satisfY ecological 
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sustainability objectives must be attractive to farmers if they are to be voluntarily adopted 
and continued. 
Farmer incentives 
Goals to maintain or increase profits are central to virtually all analyses of 
farmers' incentives to adopt new or different technologies or systems. However, it is 
well recognized that goals related to risk also play an important role in farmers' 
decisions. The risk averse behavior that farmers (like other people) often exhibit can 
have substantial implications for agri-environmental policy. Oglethorpe (1995), for 
example, has demonstrated that greater variability in the market for agriCUltural goods 
can be more conducive to farmer-adoption of less intensive practices than would be the 
case with more stable markets. One implication of this is that if government income 
protection policies take most of the risk out of intensive, specialized farming, the costs of 
utilizing agri-environmental policies to induce farmers to voluntarily adopt less intensive, 
more ecologically sustainable farming systems can be high. 
Many farmers obviously have other goals, as well-including having adequate 
leisure and family time and having a sense of independence. A set of goals with special 
relevance to this paper, however, relates to stewardship of natural resources. Some 
farmers base their farm stewardship decisions on ethical grounds to a much greater extent 
than do others, where ethical is meant to include reasons other than pure self-interest 
(Colman, 1994). Thus, it is logical to posit a 'stewardship' goal when examining farmer 
incentives to adopt ecologically sustainable systems. This goal can be interrelated with 
goals to have social standing in the local community, when and where the public values 
sound stewardship. 
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Other considerations certainly enter into farmers' decisions about adoption of 
sustainable practices, including the ability to maintain flexibility and not be tied down by 
bureaucracy. While those considerations should not be ignored, the primary focus in this 
paper-following Dobbs and Pretty (2001 a)-is on the follOwing three sets of goals: 
I. To maintain or increase net income (profits) from farming. 
2. To avoid 'excessive' risk with the income-generating activities ofthe farm; 
3. To maintain sound stewardship of the farm's natural resources. 
These goals are the ones thought to be most directly relevant to farmers' decisions about 
adoption and continued use ofecologically sustainable farming practices. 
Economic measurement 
Sometimes economic measurements to determine farmers' incentives to change to 
more environmentally sound farming practices can be carried out with farm management 
budgeting on a single crop or enterprise. Changes in tillage practices or timing of 
fertilizer applications are examples where such an approach might suffice. Moves to 
fundamentally different farming systems, however, require measurement of economic 
changes across the entire farm or, at least, a major portion of the farm. A change from a 
chemical-intensive com-soybean crop system with no livestock to a farming system that 
integrates small grains, forage legumes, and one or two livestock enterprises with 
reduced-chemical com and soybeans would call for a 'whole-farm' analysis that accounts 
for the numerous interacting changes that impact profits, risk, and natural resource 
stewardship. An interrelated set of changes in crop rotations and fertility and pest control 
methods would necessitate, at least, a 'whole-rotation' analysis. Side-by-side economic 
comparisons of profits and risks of individual crops-say, comparison of com in the 
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farmer's current system to com in the new or proposed system-would have little 
meaning. It is only the net, overall effect on profits, risk, and stewardship that has 
meaning for such system changes. 
Madden and Dobbs (1990) have discussed some of the procedures and 
considerations in carrying out whole-farm and other systems analyses. There often seem 
to be conflicting findings among various economic analyses comparing 'conventional' 
and 'more ecologically sustainable' farming systems. Among the reasons that underlie 
apparent conflicts in findings from different studies are these (Dobbs, 1994): 
1. 	 Are short-run or long-run measures of profitability used? 
2. 	 Are Federal farm program provisions accounted for in the whole-farm models 
or are they ignored (or greatly simplified)? 
3. 	 Is family labor included as a cost in the enterprise budgets? 
The approaches taken sometimes depend on the question(s) being asked. In our 
farming systems studies at South Dakota State University (SDSU), we generally have 
asked "Is there adequate incentive over the long run for farmers in particular agro­
climatic areas to adopt organic farming systems or other systems with dramatically lower 
chemical-input needs?" Consequently, we have attempted to include all costs related to 
'conventional' and 'alternative' systems-including machinery depreciation costs and 
family labor costs. Over the long run, machinery must be replaced, and even family labor 
has 'opportunity cost'. We also have generally included farm program payments and 
related provisions (e.g., acreage set-aside requirements, when they existed), since 
payments and restrictions in some form seem to be permanent fixtures of agriculture in 
industrialized countries. However, since the level and forms of payments and related 
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provisions are constantly changing, we often conduct sensitivity analyses to observe how 
economic comparisons are affected by possible changes. 
Applications 
Under the leadership of James Smolik, researchers at SDSU carried out of two 
sets of studies at the Northeast Research Station from 1985 through 1992, comparing 
selected 'alternative' (organic), 'conventional', and 'reduced tillage' crop rotation 
systems. Descriptions of the systems and the agronomic and economic methods of 
analysis are presented in Smolik, et al. (1995). This was a 'whole-system analysis' of the 
crops portion of hypothetical farms using the different systems. Possible changes in 
livestock that might result from changes in crop systems were not explicitly considered. 
We assumed that markets would be available for hay produced by one of the alternative 
(organic) systems. A summary of the profitability comparisons from 1986 (omitting 
1985, the establishment year) through 1992 is shown here as Table 1. 
Several measures of net income, averaged over the 7-year study period for each 
system, are shown in this table. The first measure, shown in the third column of data, 
includes a deduction for all costs (including items like machinery depreciation and 
interest) except land, labor, and management. The next measure (in the fourth column) 
includes all costs in the first measure plus a charge for labor used for crop production. A 
land charge is included in the final measure (in the fifth column); this final measure is 
referred to as net income over all costs except management. The land charge is the same 
for all systems. This final measure constitutes what is often referred to as pure profit or 
as return to management for planning and risk taking. The same measure is shown in the 
last column ofTable 1, except there it is on a whole-farm (540 crop acres) basis. 
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Table 1. Average economic results In the Farming Systems Studies (1986-1992). 
DDIInIAc.. 
··············Het~Ov. ........... 

WhoI. FInn 
AI COla A1ICoaa Netlnc:orM 
IIrectCoatI Except LInd Except LInd AI CoatI OVerAll 
oe-ThM Groa Labor, II'Id II'Id Except Cottl Excet!ISr..... , Labor Income ......... ........ent ......... 1IInIgement~~ 

Filming Sy.""" Study , 
1. Alternative 

(oats-alfalfa.soybeans-com) 45 153 75 
 63 :rt 20.139 
2. Conventional 

(com-soybeanH. wheat) 62 151 58 49 23 
 12.328 
3. Ridge Til 

(com-soybeans-s. wheat) 69 139 
 41 32 6 3.149 
Filming Sy""" Study. 
1. Alternative 

(oaIsdMr-soybeanH. MIeat) 
 30 101 47 38 12 6,443 
2. Conventional 

(soybeans-L Ytt1eat-barley) 48 127 
 49 39 13 6,803 
3. MnnunTIL 

(soybeans-Lwheat-barley) 
 59 116 29 20 -6 -3,360 
• Crops .. shown in the order in which thay OCCII' in -" rotatIan. 
bFor '.-m wIb 540 tIaIit ... 
Source: Dobbs (1993), p. 51 
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Just for illustrative purposes, see the net income over all costs except management 
data in the last two columns. The alternative system was the most profitable in Study I. 
Net income per acre was almost identical for the alternative and conventional systems in 
Study II, and net income for the minimum till system in that study actually was negative, 
on average-meaning gross returns fell short of covering all costs for that system. 
(Dobbs, 1993) 
'Management costs' refer here to opportunity costs of the farmer's time spent in 
planning, observing crops and making production-related decisions, and marketing. They 
were not included simply because of the difficulty in objectively measuring differences 
among systems in those costs. Overall, management costs probably are somewhat higher 
for the types of alternative systems we analyzed than for the other systems. Therefore, a 
net income measure that also factored in management costs probably would have slightly 
reduced the profit advantage of the alternative system in Study I, and it probably would 
have caused the slight advantage of the conventional system in Study II to increase 
(relative to the alternative system). 
The Federal farm program during the study period affected the net income of the 
various systems differently, with the alternative system receiving an average of $9/acre 
less per year in government payments than the other systems in Study I. In Study II, the 
alternative system received an average of $4/acre less than the other systems. (Dobbs, 
1994) 
We also examined the relative attractiveness of these systems to farmers from the 
standpoint of risk. One measure of the risk associated with different farming systems 
over time is the variability in profits over time, as measured by the standard deviation. 
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Net income over all costs except management was much less variable for the alternative 
system in Study I, for example, than for the conventional and ridge till systems. The 
standard deviation for the alternative system was $16.60/acre, compared to $31.30/acre 
for the conventional system and $29.60/acre for the ridge till system. Also, the 
alternative system never had negative net returns; this downside risk protection is an 
important consideration for most farmers. (Smolik, et aI., 1995) 
What about measures of the possible implications of these different systems for 
farmers' stewardship goals? It is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify all the relevant 
dimensions of stewardship. The research team did examine possible soil erosion and 
water quality implications, however. The alternative and reduced till systems were the 
only systems that consistently met or exceeded Federal farm program conservation 
compliance regulations for residue cover on highly erodible land. Therefore, it was 
concluded that both types of systems should adequately address soil erosion concerns and 
may help limit nitrogen and phosphate runoff. Nitrate-N levels in Study I were measured 
by soil cores in the last year, and were found to be about 2 to 3 times higher in 
conventional and ridge till systems than in the alternative system. Higher N levels may 
not necessarily indicate an environmental problem if groundwater is not vulnerable, or if 
the N is in the upper layers of the soil profile, where crops can readily use it. However, 
most of the nitrate-N in the conventional and ridge till systems was below 2 feet, 
suggesting the potential for groundwater pollution is greater for those systems than for 
the alternative system. (Smolik, et al., 1995) 
The economic results cited here for our studies at SDSU's Northeast Research 
Station were based on the assumption that no organic price premiums were received for 
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production from the alternative (organic) systems, even though farmers using those 
systems would have been eligible for organic certification and any available price 
premiums after 3 years. We made this assumption to be 'conservative' with respect to 
organic market expectations, in case substantial expansions in organic acreages were to 
wipe out or greatly diminish price premiums. In a companion study comparing an actual 
operating organic farm in east-central South Dakota with a neighboring organic farm, we 
did include organic price premiums for years in which we had appropriate data. In that 
study-covering 1985 through 1992-the organic farm was less profitable than the 
conventional farm most years, when organic price premiums were not factored in. Over 
the 4-year period 1989-1992, for which we had information on price premiums the 
organic farmer received on some of his production, including those premiums added an 
average of $ll1acre to net income over all costs except management. This was enough to 
narrow but by no means close the net returns gap between the organic and the 
conventional farm during that period. (Dobbs and Smolik, 1996) Organic price 
premiums generally were much higher in the late-1990s (Bertramsen and Dobbs, 2001), 
so the results might have been different had the study been continued for several more 
years. 
Analyses at the Local and Regional Level 
Multifunctional economic analysis at the local or regional level takes account of 
certain 'external' effects of agricultural production systems that are not necessarily 
considered by farmers in their management decisions. The natural resource economics 
literature dealing with 'market failure' provides the theoretical basis for this analysis. 
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Market failure 
'Externalities' consist of spillover effects from agricultural production-either 
positive or negative--that are uncompensated (or not accounted for in farmers' costs, if 
negative) in unregulated markets. Since externality values are not reflected in market 
transactions, markets often 'fail' to produce the socially desired amounts of primary 
agricultural commodities and the externalities associated with those commodities. In the 
case of negative externalities, such as nitrate contamination of local groundwater by 
intensive com production, 'too much' com is produced and 'too much' polluted water 
('too little' clean water) is produced. Farming systems that incorporate forage or green 
manure legumes and small grain crops in rotations with row crops provide a biologically 
diverse habitat for many birds and beneficial insects. This can be thought of as a positive 
external effect, in part, of forage and green manure legumes that is uncompensated in the 
market. Consequently, 'too little' of such legumes is grown, relative to, say, com and 
soybeans. (Prato, pp. 91-104; Zilberman and Marra, pp. 221-234) 
Market failure is based on 'technological' (or physical) externalities, rather than 
on 'pecuniary' (or price-effect) externalities. Pecuniary externalities result, for example, 
when individuals or firms purchase or sell large enough quantities of a good or service to 
affect price levels. The change in price levels affects people who are not directly 
involved in the original transactions, but who now face higher or lower prices as a result 
of those original transactions. These pecuniary externalities help some groups and hurt 
others, but they do not necessarily constitute a 'failure' of the market economy (Davis 
and Kamien, 1972). In contrast, 'technological' externalities-such as the off-site effects 
of soil erosion-often do result in market failure. It is technological externalities that are 
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commonly simply tenned 'externalities' in most of the current environmental literature 
(see Common, 1995; Knutson, et aI., 1998). 
Many of the positive externalities relevant to multifunctional analysis at the local 
or regional level have characteristics of what economists call 'public goods'. These are 
goods for which no one (practically speaking) can be excluded from enjoying, and use by 
one individual does not diminish the availability of the good for use by other individuals. 
Examples include certain types of wildlife for observation and scenic rural landscapes. 
(Mullarkey, et aI., 2001, p. 32) Of course, beyond some point of 'crowding', some such 
amenities could lose the characteristic ofnon-competitiveness in use. 
An important consideration in multifunctional economic analysis is the extent of 
'jointness in production' (Cahill, 2001). A true technological externality implies some 
jointness, say between dairy production in Wisconsin and a scenic landscape dotted with 
big white bams. In that example, the end of dairy production in an area could spell the 
eventual deterioration and disappearance of the scenic bams. On the other hand, more 
cows or more milk production per cow will not necessarily lead to more barns and 
'improved' scenery. Thus, there is some 'jointness', but it is not absolutely rigid. How 
best to save the white bams depends in part on this degree of jointness. One might let 
dairy production disappear altogether in particular areas, yet pay farmers for maintaining 
the bams, i.e., for the scenic 'function'. But would bams without any dairy cows at all 
around them or in nearby pastures provide quite the same 'scenery'? The point here is 
that analyses of policy alternatives for encouraging the beneficial multiple functions of 
agriculture must consider the nature and degree of 'jointness' between commodity and 
non-commodity outputs (Cahill, 2001, pp. 37-38). 
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I will return to the topic of policy alternatives in the section on multi functionality 
analysis at the national and international levels. At this point, however, I turn to 
economic measurement ofnon-commodity outputs of agriculture. 
Economic measurement 
By their very nature, many of the non-commodity outputs of agriculture are 
difficulty to quantify, especially in monetary terms. Consequently, non-monetary 
measures of benefits or costs frequently are heavily relied upon. Examples might be bird 
species restored, reductions in soil erosion in terms of tons of soil per acre, miles of 
public footpaths provided through scenic farm landscape, or acres of native grassland 
preserved. 
Economists have devoted a great deal of effort over the last several decades to 
developing techniques for placing monetary values on 'non-market' goods. The 
economic theory upon which these techniques are based rests on concepts of 'willingness 
to pay' and 'willingness to accept compensation'. Both indirect and direct methods of 
measurement have been used. An indirect method that has been much used for certain 
kinds of recreational experiences is the 'travel cost' approach. In this approach, travel 
distances and costs of participants in a recreational activity are used to estimate 
demand-or willingness and ability to pay-functions for the activity. The 'contingent 
valuation method' (CVM) is the most common direct valuation method. This method 
relies on surveys of sample households in which responses are elicited about willingness 
to payor to accept compensation. (Prato, pp. 305-329) 
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Applications 
A study of the relationships between farming practices and systems and water 
quality in the Sioux River drainage of eastern South Dakota illustrates quantitative, but 
non-monetary measurement of an environmental externality. Dobbs and Bischoff (1996) 
estimated net returns to land and management for different practices and crop rotation 
systems on four farms in the study area, as well as the probable nitrate leaching to 
groundwater with each of the same combinations of farm practices and systems. A 
model called the Nitrate Leaching and Economic Analysis Package (NLEAP) was used to 
estimate nitrate leaching. The relationships measured in this study for one of the case 
study farms are shown in Figure 1. This farm was an irrigated farm, on which continuous 
com was being grown on 73 acres (the 'Before' scenario in Figure 1). The other 
scenarios represent various changes that might have been possible, with financial 
assistance at the time from an agri-environmental program called the Water Quality 
Incentives Program (WQIP). Estimated net returns increased by $18/acre (29%) where 
the WQIP involved eliminating dry pre-plant inorganic fertilizer (i.e., moving from the 
'Before' to the 'After' scenario); the nitrate leaching did not change much, however. 
Profitability was 9% greater when the alternative practice of splitting nitrogen 
applications also was added to the 'After' scenario. Changes that involved alternative 
crop rotations lowered net returns-to $75/acre for a com/soybean rotation and to 
$54/acre for a 6-year rotation involving alfalfa, com, and soybeans-compared to 
$811acre in the 'After' scenario and $88/acre in the 'splitting nitrogen' scenario. 
Environmental results for splitting nitrogen applications indicated an 8% decrease in the 
amount of nitrate leached when compared to the 'After' scenario. Changing rotations 
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Figure 1. Profitability/N Leaching Relationships: 
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Source: Dobbs and Bischoff (1996), p. 19 
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showed greater decreases in nitrate leaching, however. Estimated nitrate leached went 
from 36 lbslacre in the 'After' scenario to 26 lbs/acre in the corn/soybean rotation system 
and to 25 lbs/acre in the 6-year crop rotation system (Figure 1). 
Our research comparing organic to other farming systems in northeastern South 
Dakota, discussed in the section of this paper on analyses at the farm level, can be used to 
illustrate non-monetary measurement of a 'social function'. There is a great deal of 
interest in how different farming systems affect farm size and the resulting structure of 
agriculture. Many factors affect farm size, including the farm's ability to generate 
adequate levels of family income. Therefore, we analyzed the potential farm size 
implications of the labor and management returns associated with different systems 
included in that research. In Study I, where systems included substantial amounts of corn 
and soybeans and where labor intensiveness was greater for the organic system, a 
conventional farm would have had to be nearly twice as large as an organic farm to 
generate $40,000 in net returns to family labor and management. On the other hand, in 
Study II, where systems consisted primarily of small grains, labor intensiveness was 
lower for the organic system and there was little difference between the organic and 
conventional systems in returns per hour of labor and management. Therefore, the 
implied difference in farm size was much less in Study II. (Smolik, et aI., 1995, pp. 32­
33) 
Economists in Iowa recently estimated 'willingness to pay' for either prevention 
of further deterioration of water quality or for improved water quality (Azevedo, et aI., 
2001). This was part of a comprehensive analysis of alternatives to maintain and 
improve water quality in Clear Lake, Iowa. Monetary estimates were made of the value 
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both visitors and local residents placed on preservation and/or restoration of the lake. 
Estimates revealed a high willingness to pay to avoid further deterioration of the lake, a 
willingness to pay only moderate amounts for a low quality improvement, and a 
willingness to pay substantial amounts for a significant quality improvement to lake 
conditions. 
Economists in the UK have conducted extensive analyses of agri-environmental 
schemes carried out there since the mid-1980s. Hanley, et al. (1999) recently 
summarized a review by Stewart, et al. (1997) of the major cost-benefit analyses of those 
schemes. Ten of the twelve schemes covered in this review were part of the 
Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESA) program. (When the ESA program was 
launched in 1986, it was the first agri-environmental program in the European Union.) 
The CVM method was used in most of the studies to estimate monetary benefits of the 
I 
I 
schemes. In many of the evaluations, a range of benefit estimates was presented. Benefit I 
I 
Iestimates at the upper ends of those ranges exceeded costs for each of the ESA schemes, 
sometimes by many times the costs. Hanley, et al. (1999) discuss a number of problems 
associated with such evaluations, as does Whitby (2000, pp. 324-325), who notes that 
most evaluations of UK agri-environmental schemes have not actually been able to value 
benefits at the margin. In other words, even if the ESA scheme in one area has produced 
more environmental benefits than costs, that does not necessarily imply that expanding 
the scheme or adding similar schemes elsewhere will produce greater benefits than costs. 
Although much researched by economists, monetary measurement of 'non­
market' outputs of agriculture remains a difficult and challenging task. It is not 
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something to be undertaken lightly or by analysts not fully versed in the various available 
methods and their strengths and shortcomings. 
Analyses at the National and International Level 
In many ways, multifunctional economic analyses at the national and international 
level are similar to ones at the local or regional level-especially in the sense that 
'externality' effects constitute a central consideration. However, analyses of policy 
alternatives for dealing with agriculture's multiple functions generally need to be national 
and international in scope. While local and regional policies are important, and certainly 
can make a difference, they often can be undermined by contrary policies at the national 
level or in other countries. 
Externality effects on a broader scale 
Analyses of agricultural externality effects at the national scale, or other scales 
broader than local or regional levels, call into question the sustainability of 'modem', 
'conventional' agricultural systems. One of the most recent and comprehensive such 
analyses was conducted in the UK, under the auspices of the University of Essex's Centre 
for Environment and Society (pretty, et aI., 2000). This study, carried out by a 
multidisciplinary team of researchers based at several different institutions, covered a 
number of different types of external environmental and health costs of modem 
agriculture in the UK. Seven broad categories of such costs were examined: (I) damage 
to natural capital-water; (2) damage to natural capital-air; (3) damage to natural 
capital-soil; (4) damage to natural capital-biodiversity and landscape; (5) damage to 
human health-pesticides; (6) damage to human health-nitrate; and (7) damage to 
human health-microorganisms and other disease agents. 
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Aggregating the results across all of these categories, the researchers found total 
external costs of UK agriculture in 1996 to be the equivalent of roughly $3.6 billion, or 
$318lhectare of arable land and permanent pasture. 1 These estimated externalities are 
equivalent to 89% of average net farm income and 13% of average gross farm income in 
the UK during the 1990s. Of course, there is a great deal of uncertainty associated with 
any such estimates. Therefore, the researchers showed the following estimated range of 
annual external costs for the period 1990 to 1996 (converted here to US dollars): $1.8 to 
$6 billion. (Pretty, et aI., 2000, pp. 113-118) 
As large as these estimates are, they are based only on externalities that produce 
"financial" costs. Therefore, the authors feel they underestimated the total negative 
impacts of modem agriculture (Pretty, et aI., 2000, p. 113). Regardless of the exact 
values, the magnitudes of external costs are alarmingly high, as they no doubt are in 
many other countries where agriculture has become highly 'industrialized'. I turn now, 
in the final section of this essay, to economic analysis of policy approaches for 
addressing externality and related multifunctionality concerns. 
Analysis ofpolicy alternatives 
Natural resource economics and, more recently, ecological economics have 
contributed greatly to our understanding of how best to encourage the positive, and 
discourage the negative, dimensions of agriculture'S multifunctionality. Broadly 
speaking, the alternative approaches can be classified as either regulatory or incentive­
based. 
Regulatory approaches generally set limits which can not be exceeded for 
negative externalities or other adverse effects of agriculture; or, sometimes they specify 
1 British pound = 1.,3 US dollars in July 2002. 
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required (minimum) levels of positive action or provision of non-market goods. 
'Conservation compliance' provisions of US Federal farm policy, dating back to 1985, 
require minimum groundcover on highly erodible soils as a condition for receiving 
commodity support payments. Although farmers could forgo such payments and thereby 
not be bound by these provisions, payments have been so substantial most years that the 
provisions, effectively, constitute regulations. In comparing the relative effectiveness of 
regulatory and incentive-based approaches for dealing with environmental concerns, 
Costanza, et aI. (1997) list the following advantages and disadvantages of regulatory 
approaches: 
Advantages 
1. 	 Simplicity, familiarity, and acceptance. 
2. 	 Historical U.S. reliance upon legislative regulation in order to deal 
with perceived problems. 
3. 	 Acceptance by emitters and interest groups 
4. 	 Long-term incorporation into the legal system. (Costanza, et aI., 1997, 
p. 196) 
Disadvantages 
1. 	 Effective regulation requires a level of technical and proprietary 
information that is seldom available to regulators. 
2. 	 Successful enforcement of regulation requires high monitoring and 
enforcement costs. 
3. 	 The costly bureaucracies associated with regulation result in high 
expenditure per unit ofpollution reduction. 
4. 	 Environmental regulations are easily evaded or avoided. 
5. 	 The lack of strong incentives to reduce pollution below the mandated 
level reduces motivation for technological advance and for preventing 
pollution before it is generated. 
6. 	 Polluters are permitted to ignore the costs their actions impose upon 
society at the time decisions are made. (Costanza, et aI., 1997, pp. 
196-197) 
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Incentive-based approaches attempt to take advantage of market forces as much 
as 	 possible, in order to achieve least-cost solutions to environmental objectives. 
Examples of such approaches are pollution-based taxes or fmes and incentive payments 
based on the extent of positive environmental performance. Potential advantages and 
disadvantages of incentive-based approaches, in comparison to regulatory approaches, 
include the following: 
Advantages 
1. 	 They have the ethical advantage of consistency with the .. ''polluter 
pays" principle. 
2. 	 They raise public revenues. 
3. 	 They pass the cost of pollution control along to the consumer of 
pollution-intensive products ... 
4. 	 They provide polluters with economic incentives to prevent pollution. 
5. 	 Marketable permits do not require that regulators have the level of 
technical proprietary information required for efficient regulation. 
6. 	 They can provide incentives for shifting the burden ofmonitoring from 
the government to the polluter. 
7. 	 They offer profitable opportunities for industry to undertake 
development projects for improvements in pollution abatement 
technology. 
8. 	 They can shift the incidence of tax burdens away from socially 
desirable objectives (incomes and jobs) toward reducing socially 
undesirable phenomena (pollution). (Costanza, et al., 1997, p. 205) 
Disadvantages 
Incentive-based approaches based on market theory do not directly 
address the issues of: 
1. 	 sustainable scale; 
2. 	 income distribution, or equity, and therefore of unequal access to 
environmental protection among individuals, nations, regions, and 
generations; 
3. 	 limitations of scientific information and of knowledge by individuals 
may impair their ability to make wise choices; and 
4. 	 additionally, the market failures that would need correction in order to 
make markets work for environmental quality are numerous and 
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perverse. They include externalities, excessive time discounting, 
common property resources, open-access resources, public goods, and 
noncompetitive markets. (Costanza, et aI., 1997, p. 205) 
Up to the present time, policies for agriculture in the US and European Union 
countries have emphasized incentive-based approaches. Moreover, the incentives used 
have generally been positive, such as cost-share agri-environmental schemes, rather than 
negative, such as taxes on polluting practices or inputs (though such have been used 
some). Reasons for heavy reliance on the incentive-based approach in agriculture include 
certain disadvantages of the regulatory approach listed above (#1, #2, #3, and #4) and #4 
in the above list of advantages of incentive-based approaches. Dobbs and Pretty (2001 a 
and 2001b) have examined a number of issues associated with continued reliance on and 
expansion of incentive-based agri-environmental schemes to provide positive non-market 
goods and discourage negative environmental externalities from agriculture. Among 
those issues are the following: (1) To what extent is continued financial subsidization by 
governments of the commodity production function of agriculture compatible with 
agriculture's environmental stewardship functions? (2) How can governments strike an 
appropriate balance between agri-environmental 'stewardship payments' and regulatory 
approaches? (3) Can agri-environmental programs simultaneously promote 'social' and 
'stewardship' functions of agriculture? (4) Under what conditions are stewardship 
payment schemes likely to be compatible with World Trade Organization rules? and (5) 
Should farmers who are already practicing good environmental stewardship be eligible 
for agri-environmental incentive payments? 
It remains to be seen how long citizens in North America and Western Europe 
will continue to support environmental approaches that rely primarily on incentive 
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payments to farmers. The UK government has already shown some shift in its approach 
to reducing nitrate contamination from agriculture by beginning to phase out its 
incentive-based Nitrate Sensitive Areas scheme and placing primary reliance of the 
regulatory Nitrate Vulnerable Zones scheme (Dobbs and Pretty, 2001 a). As Western 
governments place increased emphasis on agriculture's multifunctionality in public 
policies, the challenge will be how to strike an appropriate balance between policy 
options in three areas (Pretty, et aI., 2001): (1) environmental taxes; (2) production 
subsidy and agri-environmental incentive reform; and (3) institutional and participatory 
mechanisms. Approaches in this third area rest on the knowledge that if agriculture is 
truly to be sustainable in all of its important functions, farmers eventually must 'take 
ownership' of sustainable approaches, and not just be 'forced' to continue certain 
approaches by government carrots and sticks. Institutions must exist that foster and 
support on-going learning and adjustment, since there never will be a simple set of 
formulas for agricultural sustainability. 
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